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1The use of aggregate dividend ratios to predict stock market returns or the equity
premium has a long tradition in ﬁnance (Dow (1920)). Dividend ratios are the total
dividends paid by all stocks (Dt), divided by the total stock market capitalization,
either at the beginning of the year (the dividend yield, Pt  1) or at the end of the
year (the dividend price ratio, Pt). The equity premium (or market premium) is
the return on the stock market (Rm(t)) minus the return on a short-term risk-free
treasury bill (Rf(t)).
More recently, Ball (1978), Rozeﬀ (1984), Shiller (1984), Campbell and Shiller
(1989), andFamaandFrench(1988,1989)havereinvigoratedthisinterest. (Cochrane
(1997) surveys the literature.) Generally, dividend ratios are found to be statistically
signiﬁcant predictors, especially for annual equity premia. This empirical regular-
ity, that dividend ratios seem to predict equity returns, ranks amongst the most
important ﬁndings of academic ﬁnance. For example, a citation search lists more
than 200 published articles citing the Fama and French (1988) article alone. In turn,
a number of theories have recently appeared that build on the impact of predictabil-
ity. For example, Barberis (2000), Brennan, Schwatz, and Lagnado (1997), Campbell
and Viceira (1999), Liu (1999), Lynch (2001), and Xia (2001) build models for how in-
vestors should divide their assets between stocks and bonds, based on the premise
that equity premia vary in a predictable fashion.
Our paper shows that the dividend yield’s presumed forecasting ability was a
mirage. After deﬁning our variables in Section I, Section II shows that any predic-
tive ability has disappeared as of 2001. The 1990’s have not been kind to attempts
to use the dividend yield to time the market. However, our paper also shows that
even before the 1990’s, there was little reason to trust dividend ratios. We can
conﬁrm good in-sample predictive ability for annual equity premia prior to 1990,
but Section III shows that dividend ratios had poor out-of-sample forecasting ability
even then. Our out-of-sample tests diﬀer from the in-sample tests in that the fore-
casting regressions are themselves estimated only with then-available data: both
the “conditional dividend ratio model” (the prevailing forecasting regressions) and
the “unconditional historical equity premium model” (the prevailing simple moving
average) are estimated as rolling forecasts to predict one-year ahead equity premia.
1In addition, our paper shows that any residual pre-1990 out-of-sample dividend ra-
tio model performance hinged on only two years, 1974 and 1975. Thus, our paper
concludes that the evidence that the equity premium has ever varied predictably
with past dividend ratios has always been tenuous: a market-timing trader could
not have taken advantage of dividend ratios to outperform the prevailing moving
average. By assuming that the equity premium was “like it always has been,” this
trader would have performed at least as well in most of our sample. Our conclusion
is robust to a plethora of alternative speciﬁcations, enumerated in Section IV: De-
spite our best attempts, we could not detect robust out-of-sample predictive ability
of the dividend ratio models in any variation.
The reason for the discrepancy between in-sample and out-of-sample perfor-
mance is poor parameter stability. However, if Campbell and Shiller (1989) are
right, changes in the dividend processes themselves could have demanded non-
stationary dividend ratios’ coeﬃcients in explaining the equity premium. Indeed,
Section V documents that dividend ratios have become more non-stationary over
time, itself a phenomenon not commonly known. As of 2001, the dividend-ratios
have practically become random walks. Consequently, we can use the theory to
instrument the dividend ratio market premium forecasting coeﬃcients with their
own time-varying auto-regression coeﬃcient estimates. Unfortunately, despite a
good theoretical justiﬁcation, the instruments cannot do better than the plain div-
idend ratios, casting even more doubt on the usefulness of the dividend ratios as
stock market predictors.
This leaves us with the puzzle as to what dividend price ratios really predict.
Although in the early part of the sample, the dividend-price ratio used to be a good
predictor of dividend growth rate, in recent years the ratio’s predictive ability has
shifted towards an ability to predict its own future value (higher autoregressive
root of dividend-price ratio) rather than one-year ahead equity premia or dividend
growth rates. We believe this explains why, for most of the sample period, the
predictability of stock returns has been weak.
Section VI produces a data-snooped estimate of what changes in the dividend
ratio coeﬃcients would have to look like to make the dividend ratio a useful variable.
2A theory predicting future equity premia with lagged dividend ratios would have to
predict slowly increasing coeﬃcients until mid-1975, followed by slowly decreasing
coeﬃcients thereafter. In a sense, actual estimated betas seem to show a delayed
reaction to the best-ﬁt betas. Moreover, the data-snooped coeﬃcients often indicate
that a negative coeﬃcient is called for—not too attractive for an investor drawn to
dividend ratio models based on theoretical considerations.
Section VII reviews other critiques of the dividend ratio forecast. Section VIII
concludes.
I Data
Our paper relies on the well-known (value-weighted CRSP index) return on the stock
market (Rm(t)  logPt  Dt=Pt   1), where P is the stock price level
and D paid dividends; the return on 3-month risk-free treasury bill (called Rf(t)
and obtained from Ibbotson) (rf(t)  log1  Rf(t)) to compute equity premia; and
on the aggregate stock market’s dividend-price ratio (DP(t)  logDt=Pt) and
dividend-yield (DY(t)  logDt=Pt   1). We use only annual data. Dividends
are computed as sum of the last 12 months dividends, and are not reinvested over
the last year period. The data are available on our website. Table 1 provides the
descriptive statistics for the series. The properties of our series are well-known.
The average log equity premium was 6.3% in our sample period, the average divi-
dend yield was 4.3%. Figure 1 plots the time series of our regressand (the equity
premium) and our regressors (the dividend ratios). The latter makes it apparent
that there is some nonstationarity in the dividend ratios. The dividend ratios are
almost random walks, while the equity premia are almost i.i.d. Not surprisingly,
the augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test indicates that over the entire sample
period, we cannot reject that the dividend ratios contain a unit-root (see Stambaugh
(1999) and Yan (1999)).
[Insert Table 1: Descriptive Statistics]
[Insert Figure 1: Time Series Graphs]
3II In-Sample Fit
Table 2 correlates the equity premium with the lagged dividend yield. Panel A con-
ﬁrms the ﬁndings in Fama and French (1988, Table 3). Prior to the 1990’s, the divi-
dend yield (DY(t)) had signiﬁcant forecasting power, the dividend price ratio (DP(t))
had acceptable forecasting power. The t-statistics, both plain and Newey-West ad-
justed for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation range from 1.75 to 3.40. However,
when the sample is extended into 2000, the in-sample predictive ability disappears.
None of the t-statistics reaches conventional statistical signiﬁcance levels, and the
coeﬃcient estimates indicate little economic signiﬁcance.1
[Insert Table 2: In Sample Univariate Regressions]
III Out-of-Sample Forecasts
Even a sophisticated trader could not have used the regression in Table 2 to pre-
dict the equity premium. A trader could only have used prevailing information to
estimate his model, not the entire sample period. Figure 2 shows the time-series
of dividend-yield and dividend-price ratio coeﬃcients when only prevailing data is
used to estimate them. The ﬁgures indicate that a historical observer would have
progressively lowered his assessment of the inﬂuence of the dividend yield, but
progressively increased his estimate of the inﬂuence of the dividend price ratio.
(Non-stationarity of the underlying dividend model is a theme of our paper, and
will be covered in more detail below.) Nevertheless, only the dividend-yield beta
coeﬃcient would have indicated to an observer a reliably non-zero coeﬃcient for a
large part of the sample period. This is due to a small indicated standard error of
the estimate.
[Insert Figure 2: Updating Coeﬃcients]
Another illustration of the changing dividend model coeﬃcients are regression
coeﬃcients by estimation subsamples. Table 3 estimates the dividend models in
1This conclusion holds when we include the 2001 returns up to November. Assuming an equity
premium of –18%, the DP(t) t-statistics are 1.51 (1.31), for DY(t) the t-statistics are 1.54 (1.35).
4diﬀerent subperiods. The dividend price ratio coeﬃcient starts out at about zero
from 1926 to 1946, increases to about 0.2 to 0.25 from 1946 to 1970 (with very
high statistical signiﬁcance), and then returns to about zero post 1970 (and with no
statistical signiﬁcance). The dividend-yield coeﬃcient just declines over the sample
period in its point estimate, but appears most reliable in the middle period, 1946
to 1970.
[Insert Table 3: Sub-Samples]
Naturally, a historical observer would also not have had the privilege of knowing
that realized equity premia would rise. Thus, the question remains how the pre-
vailing dividend ratio regressions perform when compared against the prevailing
equity mean.
[Insert Table 4: Out-of-Sample Performance: Forecast Errors]
Table 4 displays statistics on the prediction errors when the dividend models
and the alternative unconditional equity premium forecast (based simply on the
historical mean) are estimated only with prevailing data. Table 4 shows that the
dividend yield failed to outperform the unconditional mean even in the 1946–1990
period. The dividend price ratio, ironically an insigniﬁcant in-sample performer,
could marginally outperform the prevailing mean from 1946 to 1970 (albeit not at
statistically signiﬁcant levels when we use a Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic)2
and from 1946 to 1990. With a Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic of 2.04, it has
a pvalue of 4.6%—just statistically signiﬁcant.
Yet, the dividend price ratio, too, failed to outperform the prevailing equity pre-
mium mean from 1971 to 2000 or from 1946 to 2000.
The relative performance of the forecasting models is best understood by look-
ing at Figure 3. Plotting the cumulative sum-squared error from the unconditional
model minus the cumulative sum-squared error from the dividend ratio model, a
positive value indicates that the dividend ratio has so-far outperformed the un-
conditional model. A positive slope indicates that the dividend ratio had lower
2For modiﬁcation of this statistic for overlapping observations, seeHarvey, Leybourne, and New-
bold (1997, 1998). For modiﬁcation of this statistic for nested models, see Clark and McCracken
(2000).
5forecasting error than the unconditional moving average equity premium in a given
year.
The ﬁgure shows that the dividend-yield practically never seemed to have out-
performed the unconditional forecast. The dividend price ratio sometimes did, but
like the dividend yield, it had only two really good predictive years, 1974 and 1975.
The ﬁgure is also the only instance in which we use 2001 data (ending in November
2001), a year in which the dividend ratio prediction of lower returns actually came
true. The ﬁgure shows that 2001 is only a blip, and unable to rescue the dividend ra-
tio models. A natural question is why Fama and French (1988), who perform similar
tests, come to diﬀerent conclusions. The reason is their sample period, indicated
by the arrow in the ﬁgure. Over their period, the slope of the line is suﬃciently
positive to give the dividend ratios an edge. However, extending the test period
forward or backward yields diﬀerent conclusions.
We also computed a Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic year by year to see
when the cumulative prediction error would have indicated superior dividend ratio
performance. Naturally, for dividend yields, it never could.3 For dividend-price
ratios, however, ignoring the 1950’s (when we had few observations), the dividend-
price ratio had seemingly superior sample performance in 1984, 1987, and 1990
(with DM-statistics of 2 to 2.1 [roughly equivalent to a t-statistic]). Considering that
the 1974 and 1975 outliers drive this marginal signiﬁcance, an observer should have
at least paused. But, even not considering outliers, the same observer would not
have concluded superior performance in 1985–1986, 1988–1989, and post-1990.
[Insert Figure 3: Cumulative Relative Out-of-Sample Sum-Squared Error Performance]
3Bossaerts and Hillion (1999) focus on Dt=Pt   1 and ﬁnd failure to predict out-of-sample
in the last 5 years. Our own paper shows that failure of Dt=Pt   1 to predict out-of-sample
is more systematic, going back to (at least) 1946. Further, if Bossaerts and Hillion (1999) had
entertained Dt=Pt, the out-of-sample performance of the dividend yield model would have
been better.
6IV Alternative Speciﬁcations
We also tried numerous variations. None of these variations impact our conclusion
that the out-of-sample performance has always been poor.
1. We tried reinvesting the dividends, instead of summing them. There is practi-
cally no diﬀerence.
2. We tried changes in dividend ratios, because the dividend ratio is close to
stationary. These changes in dividend ratios performed worse in forecasting
than the dividend ratios themselves.
3. We tried simple returns and yields, instead of log returns and yields. For
Dt=Pt and Dt=Pt   1, on an out-of-sample basis, the conditional pre-
diction had an RMSE of 16.9% and 18.2% respectively, while the unconditional
prediction had an RMSE of 17.2%. Again, the unconditional model beats the
dividend yield models and performs no worse statistically than the dividend-
price ratio model.
4. We tried predicting on diﬀerent horizons (monthly, quarterly, multi-yearly),
although annual horizons seem to have been generally agreed to have the
least statistical problems and the best or close-to-best performance. Some-
times, other frequencies improve the relative performance of the uncondi-
tionalmodel, sometimestheyimprovetherelativeperformanceofthedividend-
yield model. Under no frequency did we ﬁnd the dividend yield model to out-
perform in predicting at a halfway statistically signiﬁcant manner.
5. We tried to reconcile our deﬁnitions to match exactly those of Fama and French
(1988). This included using only NYSE ﬁrms, predicting stock returns (rather
than premia), and a 30-year estimation window. None of these changes made
any diﬀerence.
As already mentioned in our discussion of Figure 3, the only signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence is the choice of sample period. The Fama-French out-of-sample period
began just after the dividend-yield model had ended a 10-year poor run, and
7ended just three years before DP(t) began deteriorating.4
6. We tried diﬀerent “ﬁxed number of years” estimation windows. The uncondi-
tional model typically performs better or as well as the dividend ratio models
if ﬁve or more years are used for parameter estimation.
7. We tried standardized forecasts to see if the regressions/means could identify
years ex-ante in which it was likely to perform unreliably. (In other words, we
used the regression prediction standard error to normalize forecast errors.)
Again, the unconditional model (its forecast also standardized by its standard
deviation) beat both versions of the conditional model.
8. We tried a convex combination of the dividend yield model prediction and
the unconditional prediction. Such a “shrunk dividend yield” model does not
produce meaningfully better forecasts than the unconditional model alone.
9. We tried forecasting with the Stambaugh (1999) correction for high serial cor-
relation in the dividend yield. This worsens the out-of-sample performance,
even though the average dividend-yield coeﬃcient decreases by 0.05 on aver-
age in the DP(t) speciﬁcation and increases by 0.006 in the DY(t) speciﬁcation.
For DP(t) the RMSE increases from 15.84% to 16.02%; for DY(t), the RMSE in-
creases from 17.54% to 17.60%. Both speciﬁcations continue to perform worse
(though not signiﬁcantly) than the unconditional model.
10. We tried forecasting the E/P ratio. The equivalent table is in the Appendix.
In brief, we do not ﬁnd that earnings ratios perform any better than dividend
ratios.
11. We tried similar out-of-sample forecasts for alternative variables proposed by
Lamont (1998) and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), at least for years in
which we could ﬁnd or reconstruct the appropriate data. Lamont (1998) adds
earnings and scaled stock prices; and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999)
4Fama and French (1988, 1989) use estimation periods of 30-years to obtain an out-of-sample
estimation period from 1967 to 1986 and 1967 to 1987, respectively, which avoids some high-
variance returns in the 1930’s. As FF point out, an investor may have recognized that the post-war
period was diﬀerent enough from the pre-war period to avoid using an estimated dividend regres-
sion to predict equity premia prior to 1967. Similarly, the 1990’s poor out-of-sample performance
occurred after the Fama and French (1988) paper was written – and we know that the in-sample
relationship has recently declined.
8adds more complex measures based on analyst and accounting valuation mea-
sures for the Dow-30. We found that these models have been similarly unable
to beat the simple prevailing equity premium average in an out-of-sample fore-
casting horserace in a statistically or economically signiﬁcant fashion.
12. We tried a similar experiment for forecasts of the equity premium using the
risk-free rate. We ﬁnd some in-sample predictive ability on short frequencies
(1-month to 1-quarter), but little in-sample predictive ability on longer fre-
quencies (1-year). In any case, the out-of-sample predictive ability on annual
horizons (RMSE of 17.31%) is considerably worse than the unconditional mean
equity premium (RMSE of 15.86%). Again, we do not believe there is much
predictive ability coming from the short-term interest, either.
In sum, variations on the speciﬁcation and variables did not produce instances
which would lead one to believe that dividend yields or other variables can predict
equity premia in a meaningful way. The conditional dividend yield DY(t) regression
models predicts worse than the prevailing unconditional equity premium at least
since 1946. The conditional dividend ratio DP(t) regression models predict no better
than the prevailing unconditional equity premium. The data do not support the view
that dividend ratios were ever an eﬀective forecasting tool, even over the 1946–
1990 period. It is not likely that there is a simple model variation which can induce
superior out-of-sample performance for the dividend-ratio models.
Finally, one should recognize that diﬀerent published papers may have come to
slightly diﬀerent results, depending on how they lag the price deﬂator. For example,
BossaertsandHillion(1999)employthemorecommondividendyield(Dt=Pt 1)
rather than the dividend price ratio (Dt=Pt). Consequently, our results explain
why they ﬁnd much such poor out-of-sample performance in their 5-year out-of-
sample period. Fama and French (1988) report both measures, but emphasize the
better performance of the Dt=Pt measure.
9V Instrumenting the Changing Dividend Yield Process
and The Source of Poor Predictive Ability
[Insert Figure 4: Estimating Changing Regression Coeﬃcients]
If the theory is correct, changes in the dividend-yield auto-correlation and in
the dividend-yield’s ability to predict changes in dividend growth could themselves
imply changes in the dividend-yield ability to predict the equity premium. Figure 4
plots estimated regressive coeﬃcients for our three main series, using all the date
up-to-date.
Annual stock market returns (Rm(t)) have had low correlation, and have recently
outright shown almost no correlation with DP(t-1). However, the other two series
have changed their process parameters. The dividend growth rate (D(t)) used to
be strongly negatively correlated with DP(t-1)—it is i.i.d. today. The dividend price
ratio (DP(t)) had only mild auto-correlation in post-WW2 period, but it is practically a
randomwalktoday: pricescontinuetoberoughlyarandomwalkwithrelativelyhigh
variance, while dividends have remained not only stationary but also low variance.
These process changes can be used to enhance the dividend-ratio forecasting co-








































 D(t+1) : (1)
Assume {DP(t)} follows a stationary process with mean DP(t)  d   p. Expand
fx  log1  ex using Taylor expansion around ¯ x.
fxt  1  f¯ x  f


































Rm(t+1)     DP(t+1)  DP(t)  D(t+1)  k : (3)
Taking covariances with DP(t) and dividing by variance of DP(t),
CovRm(t+1);DP(t)
VarDP(t)







 ) Rm(t+1);DP(t)  1     DP(t+1);DP(t)  D(t+1);DP(t) : (5)
Note that these approximations work only for raw returns (instead of equity premia)
and dividend-price ratios (but not for dividend yields). Our new model thus uses
equation (5). Speciﬁcally, recursive forecasts are carried out for the dividend growth
rate and dividend price ratio. The betas from these regressions are then substituted
into equation (5) to obtain an instrumented beta for stock return forecast.
[Insert Figure 5: Campbell-Shiller Betas]
Figure 5 plots the time-series of naive stock return betas and the time-series of
instrumented CS-based betas. Note from equation 5 that the CS return beta is driven
with opposite signs by the two auxiliary betas (both of which show an upward trend
from Figure 4). The CS beta has in recent years declined because of large increase
in autocorrelation of dividend price ratio. In any case, the two betas plotted in
Figure 5 shows that the CS betas are typically slightly lower than the ordinary betas,
and more so in the 1950’s and from 1975 into the early 1990’s.
One can decompose changes in the predictive coeﬃcient itself into changes in
the persistence of the dividend-yield and into changes in the ability of the dividend
yield to predict future dividends. Diﬀerencing equation 5, we get
Rm(t+1);DP(t)     DP(t+1);DP(t)  D(t+1);DP(t) (6)
where  can be calibrated to be about 0.96 for U.S. data. That is, parameter variation
in the predictive coeﬃcient can be due to parameter variation in the dividend yield
11process or in the dividend yield vs. dividend growth relation. Using these equations,
we can run a variance decomposition for US data. DP(t+1);DP(t) accounts for 14.7%,
while D(t+1);DP(t) accounts for 31.7% of the variation in recursive Rm(t+1);DP(t) in
univariate regressions (for sample 1946–2000).
[Insert Table 5: Instrumented Dividend Ratio Forecasts for Equity Premia]
Table 5 shows the results. The table shows how three models predicting the
prevailing stock return (not equity premia) perform: the prevailing dividend price
ratio regression, the Campbell-Shiller instrumented dividend price ratio regressions
which explicitly take the changing process on dividend yields and dividend growth
ratio into account, and the prevailing unconditional stock return mean. Unfortu-
nately, despite good theoretical justiﬁcation, the forecasting ability does not im-
prove using Campbell and Shiller (1989) identities. Having taken the theory as se-
riously as we could, we have thus become even more skeptical about the ability of
the dividend ratios to predict equity premia.
This leaves us with the puzzle as to what the underlying source of this poor
predictive ability is. Cochrane (1997) argues that that the dividend-price ratio must
forecast either the future returns or the dividend growth rate. His argument re-
lies on a modiﬁcation of equation (3). Rearranging the terms in equation (3) and
recursing forward, we obtain,





i Rm(t+1+i)   D(t+1+i)  constant: (7)
The second row of this expression indeed demonstrates Cochrane’s accounting
identity that dividend-price ratio must forecast either the future returns or the
dividend growth rate. However, for one-period ahead prediction, the ﬁrst row is
more informative than the second row: The dividend-price ratio must predict ei-
ther the next period stock return, or the next period dividend growth rate, or the
next period dividend-price ratio. Figure 5 shows that the dividend-price ratio used
to be a good predictor of dividend growth rate in the early part of the sample, but
12in recent years its predictive ability has shifted towards predicting its own future
value (higher autoregressive root of dividend-price ratio) instead of either dividend
growth or future returns. This explains why, for most of the sample period, the
predictability of stock returns with dividend price ratios has been weak.
VI A Description of The Empirically Best Time-Varying
In-Sample Coeﬃcients
What coeﬃcient variations produces better out-of-sample prediction? That is, what
kind of dividend-yield coeﬃcient does it take to add useful information to the pre-
vailing mean in terms of out-of-sample prediction?
Given that we have failed to ﬁnd any out of sample predictive ability of dividend
yields from a sound theoretical perspective, it is useful to entertain some descriptive
investigations into the time-series properties of the dividend-yield coeﬃcient. This
is the ultimate data snooping.
[Insert Figure 6: The Perfect Dividend Ratio coeﬃcients To Maximize Relative
Out-Of-Sample Performance]
Figure 6 plots the dividend-yield coeﬃcient that perfectly ﬁts the next out-of-
sample data point, using as intercept the prevailing average equity premium up to
each date.5 Although some of the troughs and peaks necessarily line up with the
well-known stock market ups and downs, the two are not the same (due to time-
series changes in the dividend yield and changes in the prevailing equity premium
mean). We also overlay a 5-year moving average version over the coeﬃcient series.
The best dividend ratio coeﬃcient would be erratic in the pre-WW2 era, would
be negative in the post-WW2 era6 but steadily increasing until about 1975 (the oil-
shock), and would be slowly declining post 1975. Comparing the optimal ex-post
5An alternative exercise would be to subtract from the dividend yield its own prevailing average.
Unfortunately, the denominator often is close to zero, which explodes the coeﬃcients.
6This is similar to the conclusion reached in Pesaran and Timmerman (1995).
13beta to our ex-ante beta7 (Figure 5), the actual betas show a signiﬁcant delay relative
to the ex-post best betas: the actual beta continues to drop post-WW2 and increases
only post-1973, just as the optimal beta ends its increase and starts its decrease;
and the actual beta drops only post-1996, long lagging an ongoing decline in the
optimal beta.
There are two important remaining questions: First, why is the pattern post-
WW2 and post-1975 so diﬀerent? Are there regime changes (Pastor and Stambaugh
(2001), Viceira (1996), Jagannathan, McGrattan, and Scherbina (2000)); and if so,
why did they lead to these particular changes in the dividend yields? Second, what
should an investor do if our inference is correct that the best ex-post (data-snooped)
dividend-yield was/is negative? Is the true relationship between dividend-yields and
expected returns negative, as it has been out-of-sample? Our sharp rise post-WW2
is simply back to a zero coeﬃcient, not to a positive coeﬃcient. Should such an
investor put money into the market when the dividend ratios are low, contrary to
all theory?
VII Other Dividend Ratio Critiques
Fama and French (1988) ranks among the most inﬂuential papers of the last decade,
so it is not surprising that a number of other papers have pointed out concerns
in using the dividend yield (or ratio) to predict equity premia and stock returns
and/or introduced other variables.8 For example, Goetzmann and Jorion (1993)
use a bootstrap to evaluate the in-sample predictive performance of coeﬃcient es-
timates and ﬁnd that the Fama and French (1988) coeﬃcient estimates are upward
biased. Nelson and Kim (1993) examine coeﬃcient biases and come to similar con-
clusions. Goetzmann and Jorion (1995) ﬁnd that predictability in a longer sample
(since 1872) is marginal and argues that these tests are inﬂuenced by survivorship
7Please note that the ex-post beta here is about predicting equity premia, whereas the ex-ante
beta is about predicting stock market returns.
8We must apologize to all authors whose paper we have omitted for lack of space. However, see
Shanken and Lewellen (2000) for a novel interpretation of predictability arising from estimation
risk.
14bias. Hodrick (1992) ﬁnds that Hansen-Hodrick and Newey-West statistics are bi-
ased on longer than 1-year horizon. Stambaugh (1999) and Yan (1999) ﬁnd that
near-nonstationarity in the dividend ratios biases the t-statistics and R2. None of
these entertains our simple out-of-sample naive benchmark comparison. Fama and
French (1989) also use our naive benchmark, but their dividend forecast model
even seems to outperform out-of-sample relative to their in-sample performance.
(It is easy to miss this evidence, because the focus in Fama and French (1989) is
the addition of ﬁxed income variables to the dividend-yield.) Independently, Lee
and Swaminathan (1999) ﬁnd that the dividend yield has poor out-of-sample pre-
dictive ability in competition with their value-price ratio. After inclusion of their
V=P measure, the dividend yield has no marginal explanatory power. Their more
sophisticated model employing the V=P measure can beat a “static investment al-
location” model, but only mildly so. Similarly, Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999)
ﬁnd that, from 1963–1996, traditional market ratios had little (in-sample) predictive
power. The closest paper to our own in pointing out poor out-of-sample power may
be Bossaerts and Hillion (1999), which investigates more stringent model-selection
criteria for data from a number of countries. Still, they ﬁnd no out-of-sample pre-
dictability in a 6/90 to 5/95 hold-out sample, using Dt=Pt 1 as their forecaster.
The closest paper to our own in pointing out the possibility of a changing market is
Viceira (1996), who tests whether there is a structural break in the relation between
the dividend yield and stock returns (but fails to detect one).
VIII Conclusion
Our paper has produced the following ﬁndings:
1. Good in-sample performance is no guarantee of out-of-sample performance
in the equity premium prediction context. There has never been convincing
evidence that dividend ratios were ever useful in predicting for investment
purposes. Neither the dividend-yield nor the dividend price ratio had both
the in-sample and out-of-sample performance that should have lead one to
believe that it could outperform the simple prevailing equity premium average
15in an economically or statistically signiﬁcant manner. A naive market-timing
trader who just assumed that the equity premium was “like it has been” would
typically have outperformed a trader who employed dividend ratio forecasting
regressions.
2. Any remaining explanatory predictive ability of the dividend ratios in the post-
war period was due to two years only, 1974 and 1975.
3. As of 2001 (and including 2001, a good year for the dividend ratios!), even the
in-sample performance of the dividend ratios (over the entire sample period)
has entirely vanished.
4. The dividend yield has failed to forecast one-year ahead returns or dividend
growth rates, because it has primarily forecast its own change.
Furthermore, our paper leads us to be very skeptical that there are any vari-
ables which can predict annual equity premia. We could not ﬁnd superior out-of-
sample predictive performance for any variable proposed in the literature, using
a large variety of methodologies adopted from the literature. In many cases, it is
not just a matter of quibbling over proper methods to compute statistical standard
errors and poor test statistic power. Instead, many of the variables suggested in the
literature outright underperform the unconditional mean out-of-sample and none
outperforms it in an economically meaningful fashion.
Quo Vadis? Absent much better models (presumably generating dividend coef-
ﬁcients similar to those snooped in Figure 6) and/or new variables, it is probably
time to relegate the idea of predictability of stock returns to the long list of great
ideas in economics that ultimately failed to live up to expectations.
R.I.P.
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A Earnings Price Ratios
In this section, we use the earnings-price ratio to forecast returns. Since the earnings price ratio is
more readily available for the S&P500 index, we use data on S&P500 for this exercise. Speciﬁcally,
stock returns are deﬁned to be returns on the S&P500 index. The equity premium calculation again
subtracts the equivalent 3-month risk-free treasury bill from Ibbotson. The forecasting variable
EP(t) is the log earnings price ratio of the S&P500 index. The results of in-sample and out-of-sample
forecasting are given in Table 6. In brief, we do not ﬁnd that earnings ratios perform any better
than dividend ratios.
[Insert Table 6: Earnings Price Ratio]Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Explanation: All series are described in Section I. Rm(t) is the log of the total return on
the value-weighted stock market from year t   1 to t. EQP(t) subtracts the equivalent log
return on a 3-month treasury bill. DP(t) is the dividend-price ratio, i.e., the log of aggregate
dividends Dt divided by the aggregate stock market value Pt. DY(t), the dividend-yield
ratio, divides by Pt  1 instead. D(t) is the change in log dividends from year t  1 to t.
All variables are in percent.
JqBr is the Jarque-Bera (Jarque and Bera (1980)) test for normality. The critical level to
reject normality is 5.99 at the 95% level, 9.21 at the 99% level. ADF is the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller (1979)) test for the absence of a unit root. An ADF value
of  3:5 rejects the presence of a unit root at the 1% level ( 2:9 at the 5% level;  2:6% at
the 10% level). Every mean and median is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level.
Panel A: Sample 1926–2000
Mean Sdev. Median Min Max Skew Kurt JqBr ADF
Rm(t) 10.02 19.50 14.50  58:74 45.71  0:98 4.30 17.42  6:73
EQP(t) 6.28 19.76 9.59  59:82 45.41  0:83 3.95 11.43  6:77
DP(t)  3:28 0.40  3:27  4:48  2:36  0:70 4.16 10.22  1:42
DY(t)  3:22 0.36  3:13  4:53  2:56  1:11 4.88 26.50  0:18
D(t) 4.06 12.35 4.78  50:74 42.79  1:86 11.00 243.51  6:03
Panel B: Sample 1946–2000
Mean Sdev. Median Min Max Skew Kurt JqBr ADF
Rm(t) 11.38 15.25 14.50  32:76 40.72  0:55 2.96 2.78  6:99
EQP(t) 6.66 15.79 9.59  40:46 39.86  0:59 3.31 3.42  6:65
DP(t)  3:38 0.39  3:36  4:48  2:73  0:89 3.94 9.27  0:27
DY(t)  3:30 0.38  3:31  4:53  2:56  0:82 4.22 9.55 0.21
D(t) 5.66 5.37 4.78  5:79 20.85 0.49 3.53 2.83  3:72
Interpretation: The equity premium displays its well-known high performance of above 6%
per year (in log-terms). The dividend ratios have similar characteristics as those reported
in Campbell and Viceira (1999).Figure 1. Time Series Graphs





















Explanation: This graph plots the time series of the log equity premium, the log
dividend yield, and the log dividend-price ratio. The variables are described in
Table 1.
Interpretation: Annual equity premia are i.i.d., while dividend ratios seem station-
ary and show a long standing decline. Their concluding level is the lowest in our
sample period.Table 2. In Sample Univariate Regressions
Explanation: All series are described in Section I and Table 1. This table presents the
results of the following univariate regression:
EQP(t)      xt   1  t
The ﬁrst row of each regression is the coeﬃcient, the second line its OLS t-statistic, and the
third line its Newey-West adjusted t-statistic. Data frequency is annual. s.e. is the standard
error of the regression residuals and N is the number of observations. The Sample Period
refers to the dependent variable, EQP(t).




DP(t-1) 0.612 0.176 5.83% 4.31% 20.26% 64
(2.15) (1.96)
(1.83) (1.75)




DP(t-1) 0.291 0.070 1.79% 0.43% 19.86% 74
(1.45) (1.15)
(1.25) (1.01)
DY(t-1) 0.413 0.109 3.30% 1.96% 19.70% 74
(1.84) (1.57)
(1.87) (1.54)
Interpretation: The in-sample predictive ability of dividend ratios has disappeared as of
2000. Before 1990, the dividend yield seemed to have statistically signiﬁcant predictive
ability; the dividend price ratio seemed to have had marginal predictive ability.Figure 2. Updating Coeﬃcients




































































Explanation: These ﬁgures plot the recursive coeﬃcient estimates (i.e. using only
historically available data at each point) in a regression predicting the (log) equity
premium with the (log) dividend price ratio and (log) dividend yield, respectively.
The top graph plots the DP(t) coeﬃcient, the bottom graph plots the DY(t) coeﬃ-
cients, both obtained from univariate regressions. The bars denote plus and minus
one standard deviation.
Interpretation: Dividend Ratio coeﬃcients (predicting equity premia) show remark-
ably diﬀerent patterns, depending on their numerator. The beta using dividend-
price ratios has high standard errors, but low variability (scale!). It crosses zero in
our sample. The beta using dividend-yields is always positive, economically larger,
but also continuously declining.Table 3. Sub-Samples
Explanation: All series are described in Section I and Table 1. This table presents the
results of the following univariate regression for diﬀerent sample periods:
EQP(t)      xt   1  t
The Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are given in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Data
frequency is annual. s.e. is the standard error of the regression residuals and N is the
number of observations.




1926–1945 0.143 0.030 0.09%  5:78% 30.09% 19
(0.28) (0.19)
1946–1970 0.920 0.258 24.22% 20.77% 13.66% 24
(3.99) (3.73)
1971–2000 0.188 0.039 0.87%  2:81% 16.84% 29
(0.83) (0.54)
Dividend Yield
1926–1945 2.532 0.829 18.70% 13.92% 27.15% 19
(1.84) (1.75)
1946–1970 0.699 0.194 14.62% 10.74% 14.50% 24
(3.57) (3.07)
1971–2000 0.171 0.035 0.57%  3:11% 16.87% 29
(0.64) (0.40)
Interpretation: Estimated coeﬃcients vary widely across subperiods, casting some doubt
on the stability of the speciﬁed model.Table 4. Out-of-Sample Performance: Forecast Errors
Explanation: All series are described in Section I and Table 1. This table describes the
properties of equity premium prediction errors from a model that uses only the prevailing
historical average equity premium as a forecast and another model that uses the dividend
yield or dividend price ratio. Both models use all prevailing data beginning in 1926. The
best performers are boldfaced. The Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistics (ranging from
 1:2 to 1:0) indicate that none of the reported out-of-sample RMSE performances are
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another, except the DP(t) model for the period








Mean 0.32% 3.08% 4.78%
Standard Deviation 16.00% 15.68% 17.03%
Root Mean Square Error 15.86% 15.84% 17.54%
Mean Absolute Error 12.67% 13.24% 14.34%
First Subsample 1946–1970
Mean 1.15% 3.20% 5.53%
Standard Deviation 15.65% 14.76% 17.14%
Root Mean Square Error 15.37% 14.81% 17.68%
Mean Absolute Error 12.39% 12.39% 14.09%
Second Subsample 1971–2000
Mean  0:37% 2.98% 4.16%
Standard Deviation 16.53% 16.65% 17.20%
Root Mean Square Error 16.25% 16.64% 17.41%
Mean Absolute Error 12.91% 13.96% 14.54%
Pre-1990 Sample 1946–1990
Mean  0:69% 1.03% 2.50%
Standard Deviation 16.45% 15.47% 16.88%
Root Mean Square Error 16.28% 15.33% ? 16.88%
Mean Absolute Error 12.85% 12.56% 13.54%
Interpretation: The dividend-price ratio often outperforms the unconditional prevailing
mean out-of-sample, but the diﬀerence is not only statistically, but also economically in-
signiﬁcant. Its superior performance is not stable, i.e., present in each subsample. Only the
dividend-price ratio’s 1946–1990 out-of-sample performance is statistically signiﬁcantly
better (at the 4.6% level) than the unconditional prevailing mean. The dividend-yield reli-




































































































































































































































































































Prevailing mean   SEt
Dividend Model
where SEt is the squared out-of-sample prediction error in year t. The “uncond”
SE is obtained when the prevailing up-to-date equity premium average is used to
forecast the following year’s equity premium. The “dividend model” SE’s are ob-
tained from rolling regressions with either DY(t-1) or DP(t-1) as the (sole) predictor
of the following year’s equity premium. For a year in which the slope is positive,
the dividend ratio regression model predicted better than the unconditional average
out-of-sample. This was particularly the case in 1974 and 1975.
Interpretation: Relative to the simple prevailing equity premium mean, The div-
idend yield shows poor predictive performance in the 1960’s. Both the dividend
yield and the dividend ratio show poor performance in the 1990’s. Both dividend
ratios had only two very good years, 1974 and 1975.Figure 4. Estimating Changing Regression Coeﬃcients













Explanation: All series are described in Section I and Table 1. This ﬁgure plots the
regressive coeﬃcients for the stock return (Rm(t)), the dividend price ratio (DP(t)),
and the dividend growth rate (D(t)). The regressor in each case is the lagged divi-
dend price ratio. The estimation uses all the data up-to-date.
Interpretation: Annual stock market returns (Rm(t)) have had low correlation (and
haverecentlyoutrightshownalmostnocorrelationwithDP(t-1)). However, theother
two series have changed their process parameters. The dividend growth rate (D(t))
used to be strongly negatively correlated with DP(t-1), but it is i.i.d. today. The
dividend price ratio (DP(t)) had only mild auto-correlation in post-WW2 period, but
it is practically a random walk today: this is because prices continue to be roughly a
random walk with relatively high variance, while dividends have remained not only
stationary but also low variance.Figure 5. Campbell-Shiller Betas
Explanation: This ﬁgure plots recursive beta coeﬃcients of forecasts using dividend
price ratio as a regressor. Direct forecasts are constructed using the equation
Rm(t+1)  0  1  DP(t)
Campbell-Shiller forecasts are constructed using:
DP(t+1)  0  1  DP(t)
D(t+1)  0  1  DP(t)
1  1   0:96  1  1
Rm(t+1)  0  1  DP(t)
The recursive betas are calculated using the entire history of data available. The
ﬁgure plots these betas only for the period of 1946 to 2000.










Indirect (Campbell−Shiller) ForecastTable 5. Instrumented Dividend Ratio Forecasts for Equity Premia
Explanation: All series are described in Section I and Table 1. This table describes the
properties of stock return prediction from a model that uses only the prevailing average
stock return as a forecast (U) and two other models. Direct forecasts are constructed using
the equation
Rm(t+1)  0  1  DP(t)
Direct forecasts are comparable to those in Table 4, with the only diﬀerence that this table
forecasts the stock returns themselves while Table 4 is constructing forecasts of excess
stock returns. Campbell-Shiller forecasts are constructed using:
DP(t+1)  0  1  DP(t)
D(t+1)  0  1  DP(t)
1  1   0:96  1  1
Rm(t+1)  0  1  DP(t)
The recursive betas are calculated using the entire history of data available. The table
reports only the descriptives of forecast errors over the period of 1946–2000. The Diebold
and Mariano (1995) statistic measures the statistical diﬀerence between RMSE’s from two












Mean 2.84% 4.88% 4.70%
Standard Deviation 15.41% 15.03% 15.07%
Root Mean Square Error 15.53% 15.67% 15.66%
Mean Absolute Error 12.98% 13.45% 13.42%
Interpretation: The forecasting ability does not improve using Campbell-Shiller identities.
Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistics (which measure the statistical diﬀerence between
RMSE’s from two models and are asymptotically normally distributed) for the two models
are  0:341, and  0:345.Figure 6. The Perfect Dividend Ratio coeﬃcients To Maximize Relative Out-Of-
Sample Performance



















5 year moving average
Explanation: In each year, this ﬁgure solves the observed relationship EQP(t) 
AvgEQPj;j  1926:::t   1  t  DP(t-1) for t. The graph plots the beta
coeﬃcient for both DP(t) and DY(t), but the two lines are visually indistinguishable.
The graph also plots a 5-year moving average.
Interpretation: t is the ultimate data-snooped coeﬃcient. Judging by the 5-year
moving averages, if the sample period contained two regimes, the ﬁrst would likely
have to be the post-WW2 era, the second the post oil-shock period. Still, a negative
coeﬃcient is unlikely to appeal to an investor attracted by theoretical rationales for
forecasting with the dividend-ratios.Table 6. Earnings Price Ratio
Explanation: This table presents the results of the following univariate regression:
EQP(t)      EP(t-1)  t
where EQP(t) is the excess return on the S&P500 index, and EP is the log earnings price ratio
of the S&P500 index. Panel A gives the results for in-sample regression. The ﬁrst row of
each regression is the coeﬃcient, and the second line its Newey-West adjusted t-statistic.
Data frequency is annual. s.e. is the standard error of the regression residuals and N is
the number of observations. The Sample Period refers to the dependent variable, EQP(t).
Panel B describes the properties of EQP(t) prediction errors from a model that uses only the
prevailing historical average EQP(t) as a forecast and another model that uses the earnings
price ratio. Both models use all prevailing data beginning in 1926. The best performers are
boldfaced. The Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistics indicate that none of the reported
out-of-sample RMSE performances are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another.
Panel A: In Sample
Sample Period   R2 R
2
s.e. N
1926–2000 0.296 0.085 4.56% 2.69% 15.25% 53
(2.49) (1.90)
1926–1990 0.438 0.148 9.77% 7.57% 15.33% 43
(3.38) (3.04)









Sample Period 1946–2000 Sample Period 1946–1990
Mean 0.46% 0.99% -0.24% -0.81%
Standard Deviation 15.54% 15.31% 15.96% 15.32%
Root Mean Square Error 15.40% 15.20% 15.79% 15.17%
Mean Absolute Error 12.24% 12.26% 12.44% 11.91%